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BAR BRIEFS
THE PRESIDENT'S PAGE
The 1929 annual review of legal education of the Carnegie
Foundation for the advancement of teaching contains a review of several
suggested methods for the "improvement of the legal profession on the
practical and ethical side." The first is a renewal of the graded bar
system that was part of our early history. The criticisms of this method
are forcefully stated. The second proposed method is a periodical
renewal of the attorneys' license. Several serious objections are pointed
out against this method. The last one is that denominated as a Junior
or Interlocutory bar. Under this plan the applicant, after passing the
bar examinations, is given full right to practice in all courts but con-
ditionally. After a certain number of years these privileges will expire
unless confirmed by the Supreme Court. The report has this to say, in
part, regarding the interlocutory bar:
"This plan, if properly worked out in detail, would avoid objections
that may be urged on principle against the other two. In particular it
cannot be fairly criticised as lengthening still further the period of
preparation required before young men and women are permitted to
begin their professional career. This career, if it ever begins at all,
will do so at the precise moment where it begins now; namely, after
applicants have been first admitted to practice. Deserving young prac-
titioners who, during the next few years, have been successful in estab-
lishing professional connections will find the subsequent qualifying
test in actual operation, little more than a formality. The few undeserv-
ing who will be excluded on ethical grounds have no claim upon our
sympathy. The main end served by the test will be told. Even though
liberally administered, as all experience indicates that it would be, it
should reduce the number of those who engage in improper professional
practices during these early habit forming years, and it will separate
from the profession those who, after a reasonable period of trial, have
been unable to secure a foot-hold."
Lloyd N. Scott of the New York City Bar, as a member of its
committee on Legal Education, has made a careful study of the matter
and this is the result of his best thought. He has made the suggestion
that the period of conditional practice be limited to two years and has
suggested the form of examination at the end of the two year period.
Under his plan the candidate for final admission would be required to
keep a diary of his legal work during the two years and furnish satis-
factory evidence that his legal work and pecuniary transactions have
been conducted in a satisfactory and businesslike manner; that he has
lived up to the Code of Ethics prescribed by the Bar. Association, and
that he had then acquired sufficient responsibility for final admission
to the Bar. The interlocutory bar plan has much to commend itself
as a practical reform.-A. M. KVELLO, President.
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
State vs. Malusky: Ye Editor undertakes the task of reviewing
this decision, knowing full well that whatever he may say may be mis-
interpreted, just as what the various members of the Supreme Court
said may be, and probably has been, misinterpreted.
The Facts: Defendant pleaded guilty to engaging in the liquor
traffic as a second offense; he was sentenced; later it was discovered
that he had previously been convicted of grand larceny in Wisconsin






he was re-sentenced under the provisions of Chapter 162, 1927 Laws,
the trial Court deciding that the maximum penalty application was
mandatory. On appeal, the main question was: What, if anything, is
the effect of Section 4 of that statute (habitual criminal act), which
reads, "Provided, that the provisions of this act shall not apply to of-
fenses made felonies by statute not involving moral turpitude?"
Held: That a violation of the liquor laws involves moral turpi-
tude; that the Legislature intended to include such violations under
the habitual criminal act; but that the imposition of the maximum
penalty is not mandatory.
This case is going to cause more discussion in North Dakota than
any other case decided in recent years. It is interesting, to say the least.
In fact, cases concerning liquor law violations are becoming more and
more interesting, and productive of more and more and Warmer and
warmer discussion. One is impressed with a feeling existing among a
great many people that courts and legislatures seem to be vying with
one another, in the endeavor to see which can do more to make our
liquor control program obnoxious-unintentionally, of course.
It is difficult to convince one's self that this decision has actually
been rendered, but it is true-we read the 49 typewritten pages. We
read them just the day after the decision was handed down, and just
two days after our May issue of Bar Briefs went into the mails, cover-
ing, on its front page, a bootlegging case in Federal Court. Two de-
cisions so contrary in effect and in general spirit are seldom rendered
within the same state in such a short space of time; and, to our mind,
neither of them represents quite the reasonable attitude towards these
liquor questions.
It will be noted, from these remarks, that we recognize the pro-
nouncement of the majority of the Supreme Court as the law of this
state, but that, personally, we prefer the reasoned judgment of the
.minority of that Court. In fact, we rather believe that the first sixty
days of 1931 will see the exercise of a legislative pardoning power or
the application of an informal legislative recall of the decision by a
further amendment of the law. In other words, we believe the legis-
lature specifically had in mind just such a case as this Malusky case
when it wrote the proviso quoted in the first paragraph.
. One of the majority opinions states, "A man guilty of a felony is
ipso facto infamous, and no man could be rendered infamous without
showing moral turpitude". In another place it is stated, "The stand-
ard is public sentiment", and again, "Moral turpitude implies something
immoral in itself, the act and not the prohibition fixes the moral turpi-
tude". These statements, to us, do not appear "to click". It may, of
course, be because of our early environment and training, but it is the
fact, nevertheless. Nor does a succeeding reference carry conviction
to us. In speaking of grand and petit larceny, one of the majority re-
marks that the former is a felony and the latter a misdemeanor, but
that both involve moral turpitude. The majority, however, fails to
consider, at least record, what appears to us to be a rather important
thought, namely: that people everywhere recognize stealing to be in-
herently wrong-law or no law, most any one's conscience registers "It
is wrong." We doubt, however, if there has ever been a majority in
otir country or state that considered it "inherently wrong" to drink,
make or sell a certain kind of personal property known as intoxicating
liquor. It has been declared wrong by law, because at one time, at
least, a majority considered it for the best interests of all the people to
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prevent the sale of liquor as a beverage. So far as we know, however,
the dispensing of liquor for medicinal purposes has never ceased or been
prevented. Well, if it isn't "inherently wrong" to drink or sell it for
medicinal purposes, how can it be "inherently wrong" for any particular
individual to use it as a beverage? It is wrong to sell it as a beverage
but only because the law says so. Repeal the punishment for stealing,
and it will still be considered wrong to steal. Remove the punishment
for liquor selling, and a host of people will insist that it isn't wrong to
sell liquor to a man, unless it is commonly known that the purchaser
needs the protection of society to prevent him from making a "hog" of
himself.
At any rate, Judges Birdzell and Christianson seem to us to have
gathered the gist of the controversial points into a few words. The
former says, "The majority leaves no room for the operation of the
proviso". The latter, in referring to the legislative intent, says, "They
(the legislature) said in words, and in circumstances, too clear for
doubt that it was their deliberate intention that no person should be
subject to the provisions of the act upon conviction of any offense made
a felony by statute 'not involving moral turpitude' "
As stated before, we had an interesting time going through, over and
around the forty-nine typewritten pages of the Malusky decision; we
bow to the inevitable; believe others should likewise; and therefore,
hope that all of our friends will keep their cellars clean after this.
ANNUAL MEETING
Prospect of obtaining Honorable George W. Wickersham, chair-
man of President Hoover's Crime Commission, as the principal speaker
to address the annual meeting of the State Bar Association at Devils
Lake is an outstanding item of interest to lawyers who are planning upon
attending the state meeting. The convention is slated to be held August
15th and I6th, followed by a golf tournament on the Devils Lake golf
links on Sunday,'August I 7 th.
At the time of the writing of this item, Secretary Wenzel is in
Washington for a personal interview with Mr. Wickersham, and hopes
to receive his promise to attend the state meeting.
Another item of interest will be the address of the Honorable H. A.
Bergman, K. C., barrister and solicitor, of Winnipeg, who will address
the Association on the topic, "A Brief Outline of Some of the Principal
Differences Between the Canadian and American Systems of the Admin-
istration of Justice." Mr. Bergman is just leaving on the expediti6n
to Iceland to participate in the celebration of the one thousandth anni-
versary of the establishment of the Icelandic Parliament, but will return
in time for the North Dakota State Bar meeting. Mr. Bergman is a
graduate of the University of North Dakota Law Department. From
North Dakota he went to Winnipeg and continued the study of law
there, was admitted to practice in Canadian courts, and has now the
honor of being .known as King's Counsel.
The annual banquet will be presided over by the Honorable
George F. Shafer, Governor of North Dakota. It is expected that
addresses will be given at the banquet by two members of the Bar of
North Dakota, one of them a woman practitioner. Negotiations are also
being conducted for the obtaining of a prominent member of the Winnipeg
Bar as a speaker at the banquet.
The lawyers of Devils Lake, with Fred J. Traynor chairman, are
making extensive plans for the entertainment of the members of the
